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INTRODUCTION
One of the major principles underpin­
ning South African local government 
reform in the 1980s was devolution of 
power to local authorities. The issue of 
devolution has been one of the most 
hotly debated local government issues 
amongst academics, local government 
practitioners and urban observers. On 
the one hand, the government argued 
th a t ex ten s iv e  d ev o lu tio n  to  local 
authorities had occurred (Botha, 1985), 
while on the other academics and cer­
tain local governm ent practitioners 
have retorted that minimal devolution 
has in fact taken place (Craythorne, 
1990; Cameron, 1991). In the Cape, the 
Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO) 
of 1985 has been held up by the gov­
ernment as an example of its devolu­
tion policy. A special issue of this jour­
nal in 1987 discussed LU PO ’s major 
aims and objectives and likely impact. 
This paper exam ines the im pact of 
LUPO upon the activities of the Cape 
Town City Council (CCC) from 1987 
to 1990, with specific reference to the 
question  of w hether this O rdinance 
has, in fact, given the local authority 




In tergovernm ental re la tions can be 
defined as the geographical division 
of powers among the various tiers of 
g o v ern m en t w ith in  a n a tio n  sta te . 
There are various concepts used to 
describe different forms of intergov­
ernm ental re la tio n s. The generally  
accepted distinction is that decentrali­
sation is a blanket term, encompassing 
a num ber of sub-categories: devolu­
tion, deconcentration, and delegation. 
D ecen tra lisa tio n  can be defined  as 
“the transfer of responsibility for plan­
ning, management, and resource-rais­
ing and allocation, from  the central 
governm ent and its agencies to field 
organisations of those agencies, sub­
ordinate units of governm ent, semi- 
autonomous public corporations, area- 
wide, regional or functional authori­
ties or non-governm ental private or 
voluntary organisations” (Rondinelli, 
1981:137).
Devolution is the most extensive form 
of decentralisation. It is the “confer­
m ent o f ru le-m aking and executive 
pow ers o f  a sp e c if ie d  or re s id u a l 
nature on form ally constitu ted  sub­
national u n its” (V osloo, K otze and 
Jeppe 1974:10). However, devolution 
does not mean that local authorities 
have carte blanche to do as they wish. 
They are not city states; their ability 
to make policy is limited in a number 
o f  w ays, fo r exam ple  they  can n o t
make laws which conflict with nation­
al leg is la tio n  and th e ir pow ers are
often specified by a higher tier of gov­
ernment. Deconcentration is normally
the least extensive form of decentrali­
sation. It often involves the transfer of
the workload from the central govern­
ment head offices to regional branches
located outside the executive capital
(Rondinelli, 1981:137). It may involve
limited discretionary powers for field
staff to perform functions within cen­
tral government guidelines. However
effective control over m ajor policy
decisions normally resides at central
level. D eleg a tio n  fa lls  som ew here
along the continuum between decen­
tra l is a t io n  and  d e c o n c e n tra tio n .
D e le g a tio n  e n ta ils  the  tra n s fe r  o f
broad authority to plan and implement
decisions concerning specific activi­
ties to o rg an isa tio n s such as local
au thorities that are technically  and
administratively capable of perform ­
ing them  (R o n d in e lli, 1981: 138).
Although delegated power is normally
controlled by the attachment of condi­
tions by the delegating body, this form
of delegation can lead to the exercise
of a certain amount of judgm ent and
discretion on the part of local authori­
ties.
THE INTRODUCTION OF LUPO
In 1985 the Cape Provincial Council 
prom ulgated the Land Use Planning 
O rdinance (LUPO) No 15 o f 1985, 
which replaced the cumbersome and 
outdated Township Ordinance No 33 
o f 1934, which reflected  the highly
centralised state of affairs which had
hitherto pertained and in which most
planning decisions had to be referred to
the A dm inistrator for final approval.
LUPO took effect on 1/7/1986 and pro­
vided for, among other things:
(i) that the land scheme of the entire
province is subject to zoning schemes,
whereby the permissible use of land is
prescribed in scheme regulations, and
that a change of use of land is subject
to rezon ing  approval on a un iform
basis;
(ii) for control over the subdivision of
land;
(iii) for total flexibility in the applica­
tion of zoning schemes by means
of the approval of departures;
(iv) for the introduction of structure
plans which have as their objec­
tives the provision of guidelines
for future development in a spe­
cific area, and the empowering of
loca l a u th o ritie s  to deal w ith
rezonings themselves within the
constraints of such plans;
(v) fo r a r ig h t o f  appeal to the
A dm inistrator against the deci­
sions of local authorities;
(vi) for a right of appeal to an appeal
committee if a local authority and
a developer cannot com e to an
agreement with regard to the sup­
ply of services (CPA, 1987:27).
A cco rd in g  to  a sen io r Cape
Provincial Administration (CPA)
p lan n er, LU PO  had fou r m ain
objectives:
* The first was the prom otion of
forward planning in order to expe­
d ite  to w n sh ip  e s tab lish m en t.
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A ccordingly, forw ard planning 
was to be embodied in structure 
plans.
* The second was the reinforcement
of free market principles in land
use control. An attempt was made
in LUPO to give free market prin­
ciples greater recognition.
* The third was rationalisation of
procedures. A major problem of
the old ordinance was that it was
d if f ic u lt  and cu m b erso m e to
adm inister. LUPO accord ingly
simplified and streamlined proce­
dures.
* The fourth  and m ost im portant
objective for the purposes of this
paper, was the promotion of devo­
lution of power. Special m echa­
nisms were written into the ordi­
nance in order to give positive
substance to this policy in respect
of land use planning. The underly­
ing principle was that the devolu­
tion of land use control could be
achieved effectively by control
over forward planning. The CPA
felt that in terms of this approach,
a fairly flexible system of devolu­
tion could be instituted. Provision
was made for a fairly flexible sys­
tem along a sliding scale in which
levels o f devolution could vary
from place to place. Control was
accordingly concentrated on struc­
ture plans, which were to be used
to devolve zoning schemes and,
through the zoning scheme, the
power to subdivide land (Theunis- 
sen, 1987: 2).
LU PO  p ro v o k ed  an im m ed ia te  
response from planners in the CCC’s 
Town Planning branch who took issue 
with the claim that LUPO embodied 
devolution of powers. They pointed out 
that nearly all the major powers con­
ferred in terms of LUPO including the 
approval o f rezoning, subdivisions, 
departures, deem ed zoning and any 
decision or action of a council were 
subject to review  by the Provincial 
Administrator, a government appoin­
tee1. Only a few m inor powers were 
non-reviewable. This form of decen­
tralisation was in fact a form of delega­
tion and not devolution. The power to 
review  any d ec ision  or ac tion  was 
retained by the A dm inistrator, who 
could direct the council to act, or could 
act for it, as the case may be. There
were also a number of powers which 
w ere no t d e leg a ted . The A d m in i­
stra tor’s control over local authority 
p lann ing  and po licy  was ex tended  
through his powers to approve or reject 
structure plans. In respect of appeals, 
he had wide-ranging powers to over­
turn local authorities’ decisions.
It was argued that this power of inter­
vention had the effect of nullifying the 
powers delegated to local authorities. 
There were also a number of planning 
functions retained by other government 
agencies. For exam ple, even though 
local authorities now had responsibility 
for preparing a structure plan, they had 
to co n fo rm  to the D ep a rtm en t o f 
C o n s titu tio n a l D ev e lo p m en t and 
P la n n in g ’s (now  P lan n in g  and 
Provincial Affairs) guide plans for the 
area (Ketelbey and Commins, 1987:45- 
48). They concluded that it appeared 
“that delegation  o f pow ers to local 
authorities under the LUPO does not 
effectively grant them greater freedom 
to decide or to a c t” (K ete lbey  and 
Commins 1987:47). This was also the 
CCC response. An official CCC docu­
ment concurred with this interpretation 
of events, pointing out that only a few 
development control powers had been 
delegated (CCC, 1987:12).
The su ccessfu l im p lem en ta tio n  of 
LU PO  was p red ica ted  upon lo,cal 
authorities drawing up their own struc­
ture plans. However, a number of local 
authorities, including the CCC, had by 
1988 not drawn up their own structure 
plans. By this time the city had com­
mitted itself to public participation in 
future development. This involved get­
ting public  input before  producing 
structure plans for different areas and 
entail an extended period for consulta­
tion. The CPA were, however, anxious 
to delegate powers as soon as possible 
and were contem plating drawing up 
their own structure plan which would 
give the city new powers but would set 
the parameters for Cape Town’s future 
development (CCC, 1986:2-3).
A ccord ing ly , in 1988 the M EC for 
Local Government, Pieter Schoeman, 
announced that an inquiry was to be 
m ade in to  g iv ing  local au th o ritie s  
greater powers regarding sub-divisions 
of properties and departures from the 
zoning scheme. It was announced that 
the intention was to ensure that the 
A dm inistrator would retain the right
only to ad jud ica te  appeals. A t that 
stage many of the larger applications 
had, in term s of LUPO, to be trans­
ferred to him (Cape Times, 22/7/1988). 
This was a tacit admission on the part 
o f  the CPA tha t LU PO  was no t as
decentralised as initially claimed.
In terms of CPA circular GDK/LDC/ 
9/1988, the Administrator approved a 
general s tructure  plan for the C ape 
Province which authorised local author­
ities, with effect from 1/1/1989, to grant 
or refuse zoning applications with the 
exception of the following cases:
(a) any rezoning where a state institu­
tion , inc lud ing  a M anagem ent
C om m ittee , was not in favour
thereof;
(b) any rezoning below the one-in-50-
year floodline, unless an approved
structure plan existed for the rele­
vant area;
(c) any rezon ing  o f a public open
space where an appropriate struc­
ture plan had not been approved
by the Administrator;
(d) any rezoning of land within para­
meters of the highwater mark for
w hich  a p e rm it is req u ired  in
term s o f  the  E n v iro n m en ta l
Conservation Act;
(e) any rezoning which is inconsistent
with another structure plan applic­
able to the area concerned, and
which has been approved by the
Administrator;
(f) any rezoning permitting the deve­
lopment without further consent,
o f  f la ts  an d /o r to w n -h o u ses
(groups of dwelling houses) in a
low density single residential area.
In addition, the Administrator retained 
his right to adjudicate on appeals from 
applicants or objectors.
According to a senior CPA official, 
90% of the A dm in istra to r’s pow ers 
were delegated to local authorities in 
terms of this structure plan. However, 
it is important to note that the CPA’s 
intention was to delegate all the powers 
th a t w ere d eem ed  to  be o f m ino r 
im portance. D ecisions in respect of 
important items and appeals were still 
to be handled by the A dm inistrator. 
The CCC does not consider that it has 
received  m ajor pow ers in land use 
p lan n in g  (In te rv iew s w ith  the 
Chairman: Town Planning Committee 
and sen io r CCC p lanner, 1990). A
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senior CPA official agreed with this 
interpretation, explaining that the rea­
son for these delegated powers was pri­
m arily  adm inistra tive convenience. 
The planning section had assumed con­
trol of Black local government affairs 
in 1986 and it found itself with insuffi­
cient staff to perform its functions. The 
1988 structure plan must be seen very 
much in this context of trying to dele­
gate certain minor powers in order to 
speed up the workflow at CPA’s town 
planning branch (Interview with senior 
CPA planner, 1990).
However, the CCC is also responsible to 
a certain extent for the fact that few sub­
stantive powers have been delegated to 
it. The fact that it had not drawn up a 
citywide structure plan meant that sub­
stantive powers could not be delegated. 
The CPA circular in this regard stated 
that local authorities should proceed 
with the preparation of structure plans 
because this might result in councils 
ob ta in in g  m ore pow ers (CPA , 
GDK/LDC 9/1988). The CCC did apply 
for exemption in terms of the previously 
noted six items which must be referred 
to the Administrator: on the grounds 
that the city was a large local authority 
with extensive expertise in its town 
planning branch (with more than 40 
planners it is the biggest local authority 
town planning branch in the country), 
and was well equipped to handle these 
functions. However, this request was 
turned down by the CPA. Its viewpoint 
was that this structure plan was intended 
to be a uniform document applicable to 
all local authorities for an interim period 
of five years. It would be difficult to 
administer if there were exceptions. At 
the end of 1998 this structure plan will 
lapse. By this time the CCC should have 
drawn up its own structure plan which 
would have allowed it to receive more 
substantive delegations (Interview with 




All appeals in respect of land use plan­
ning are handled in the following way: 
if there is an appeal, the CCC’s docu­
m entation as well as the objections 
m ust be subm itted  to the A d m in i­
strator. Senior planning staff of the 
physical planning branch go out to 
examine the erf concerned. In addition, 
all views of interested parties are thor­
oughly canvassed. The senior planning
s ta ff  then  m ake reco m m en d a tio n s 
w hich are subm itted  to the  C C C ’s 
Executive Com m ittee (EXCO). The 
Administrator, after consultation with 
EXCO, then makes the final decision 
(Interviews with senior CPA and CCC 
officials, 1990).
How has the delegation of planning 
power affected the intergovernmental 
relations between the CCC and CPA? 
From 1986 until 1988 there was little 
change in the centralised way in which 
land use planning issues were handled. 
H ow ever, in 1987 a m ajor land use 
co n tro v ersy  betw een  the CCC and 
CPA em erged. The CCC had turned 
down an application to rezone a prop­
erty in Kenilworth from residential to 
b u s in ess  use  (se rv ice  s ta tio n ). 
However, according to the Chairman 
of EXCO, the Administrator rezoned 
the site without any discussions with 
those affected, w ithout consultation 
and without calling for objections. This 
was desp ite  the fact that there was 
large-scale resident opposition to busi­
ness intrusion into the area (The Argus 
1/5/1987; Southern Suburbs Tatler, 
24/4/1987). After vociferous resistance 
to this decision the CCC went to the 
Supreme Court and won an uncontest­
ed victory. (By this time, however, the 
CPA had withdrawn its decision.) The 
ap p lican t then  reap p lied , the CCC 
again turned down this application and 
the CPA overruled the CCC’s decision 
once more. This matter was eventually 
resolved when the particular oil com ­
pany bought the property and decided 
no t to rezo n e  (S o u th ern  Sub u rb s  
T a tle r , 2 5 /2 /1 9 8 8 ; C ape T im es, 
4 /12 /1987  and 16/12 /1987). T here 
were also o ther occasions when the 
CCC’s decisions were vetoed on zon­
ing issues (Cape Times, 2/6/1988).
The Kenilworth garage incident can, 
however be considered a turning point 
w ith respect to appeals. It caused a 
great deal of rancour in CCC circles. 
T he CCC and CPA su b seq u en tly  
decided that when there were appeals 
the MEC for Local Government Pieter 
Schoem an, and the Chairm an of the 
CCC Town Planning Committee Clive 
Keegan, would go on site visits togeth­
er. These two politicians developed 
quite a good rapport with appeal mat­
ters also often being discussed infor­
m ally  betw een  them  over the te le ­
phone. A fter this relations improved 
and the CPA became more receptive to
the C C C ’s v iew  w hen it cam e to 
appeals, siding with the local authority 
on most of these issues. If an appeal 
was upheld, full reasons for the deci­
sion were given to the CCC. Notwith­
standing this, it must be reiterated that 
the Administrator still retained most of 
the im portant final decision-m aking 
powers.
THE TRANSFER OF 
PLANNING POWERS TO 
THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
On 1/4/1989 certain planning powers 
w ere tra n s fe rre d  to the  L ocal 
G overnm ent D epartm ent, H ouse of 
A ssem bly, in term s o f the “general 
affairs”/ ”own affairs” form ula. This 
form ula affected the C C C ’s area of 
jurisdiction in the following ways:
(i) all the A dm inistrator’s planning
powers in respect of W hite resi­
dential areas were to be tran s­
ferred to the House of Assembly;
(ii) all planning powers in respect of
Coloured and Indian residential
areas were to be retained by the
CPA;
(iii) all planning powers in respect of
W hite Central Business Districts
(CBDs) and industrial areas were
to be transferred to the House of
Assembly (CPA diagram, 1989;
Department of Local Government,
House of Assembly, 1989).
The transfe r o f CBDs in particu la r 
m ust be considered rather surprising 
because of the fact that the city is a 
fre e - trad in g  a rea  w here B lacks, 
Coloureds and Indians may trade. In 
addition , thousands o f m em bers of 
these groups commute and work there. 
A similar argument to a lesser extent 
can be made about industrial areas. In 
any event, approximately 80% of plan­
ning functions were transferred to this 
Own Affairs Department.
This also m eans there are now two 
LUPO provincial ordinances: one for 
“general a ffa irs” and one for “own 
a f fa ir s ” . The W hite  Own A ffa irs  
Department soon amended their ordi­
n ance . W h ile  it w as a p ro ced u ra l 
change to give the Department greater 
pow ers to in troduce  regu la tions in 
terms of appeals, it soon became appar­
ent that this duplication had the poten­
tia l o f becom ing  an adm in istra tive  
n ightm are for everyone concerned. 
There is now a joint CPA/Own Affairs 
liaison working committee on land use
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planning to ensure that changes to the 
ordinance are done jointly (Interviews 
w ith  sen io r o ff ic ia ls  CPA and 
D epartm en t o f L ocal G overnm ent, 
House of Assembly, 1990).
HOUSE OF ASSEM BLY/CCC
INTERGOVERNM ENTAL
RELATIONS
In practice, 90% of CCC appeals are 
now handled by the White M inister’s 
Council. It follows the same procedure 
as that o f the CPA for considering  
appeals, the only difference being that 
the Ministerial Representative and not 
the Adm inistrator has the final deci­
sion. Although this paper covers only 
the first 21 months of this relationship, 
one can already suggest that this White 
Own Affairs Department’s attitude to 
planning is different from the CPA ’s 
and is out of step with the govern­
ment’s supposed policy of devolution.
This allegation is made on the basis of 
the follow ing: the D epartm ent con­
stantly upholds appeals against local 
authorities’ zoning decisions and it has 
a lso  abandoned  the jo in t s ite -v is it 
m echanism  that the CCC and CPA 
used in respect of appeals. Its view ­
point is that such visits are a violation 
of the audi alterem partem  rule. It felt 
that it would.be illegal to have a joint 
visit with only one of the parties con­
cerned in an appeal (Interview  with 
D epartm en t o f L ocal G overnm ent: 
House of Assembly officials, 1990).
F u rtherm ore , no reasons were fu r­
nished to the CCC for the upholding of 
appeals. According to a CCC official, 
one out of every two appeals is upheld 
by the Ministerial Representative, who 
has the final say in this regard. This has 
caused a great deal of disquiet among 
members of the CCC. The Chairman of 
the CCC’s Town Planning Committee, 
Clive Keegan, has stated, in response 
to this spate of reversals of decisions 
on appea l, tha t “ we are obv iously  
powerless to do anything and have just 
becom e feeble, em asculated  rubber 
stamps” (The Argus, 25/10/1990).
As to why the Department is adopting 
such a centralist attitude one can only 
surmise, whilst there is no conclusive 
evident to support this claim, three pos­
sible reasons may be suggested. Firstly, 
because of its apartheid orientation, the 
D epartm ent is m ore likely  to have 
attracted staff of a conservative bent, 
who are  steeped  in the trad itio n a l 
b u reau cra tic  au th o rita rian  a ttitu d e  
towards local authorities. Secondly, it 
is a m u sc le -fle x in g  e x e rc ise . The 
Department is a new creation and it is 
attem pting to assert its authority on 
local authorities through these central­
ist actions. This argument is plausible 
to a certain extent. It is much smaller 
than  the CPA , and som e o f these  
actions can be attributed to attempts to 
elevate this “own affairs” , structure to 
the same level as its “general affairs” 
counterparts. It may be trying to show 
local authorities that it is a new force to 
be reckoned with.
The third suggests that the reason for 
this centralist approach has nothing to 
do with any ulterior motives, but relates 
to the lack of com petent planners to 
handle these functions. It was m en­
tioned by a number of interviewees that 
although 80% of the CPA ’s land use 
planning functions were transferred to 
the Own Affairs Department, this was 
not matched by the concomitant trans­
fer of staff. The latter body had only 
two planners transferred to it, while the 
CPA retained more than 20 planners on 
its staff. In addition, neither of these 
two planners held senior positions, they 
were and are still hopelessly overbur­
dened with work and have insufficient 
time to review each appeal properly. 
The patently authoritarian decisions 
must therefore be seen as being just as 
much due to “work overload” as to a 
muscle-flexing exercise.
As to why this state of affairs arose 
may be attributed to: firstly, these pow­
ers w ere transferred  in great haste. 
There had not been sufficient syste­
matic investigation into what functions
should be transferred. It was felt in 
government circles at the time, most 
fo rc e fu lly  by C hris H eun is, then  
M inister of Constitutional D evelop­
ment and Planning, that these powers 
had to be transferred as soon as possi­
ble to embody the “own affairs” com­
ponent of the constitution2. Secondly, 
there was a great deal of opposition 
within the CPA to the transfer to such 
pow ers3. The structure of the South 
A frican public service is such that 
senior posts depend on the number of 
subordinate staff. If a substantial num­
ber o f personnel were to have been 
transferred, this would have reduced 
the staff establishment and led to the 
abolition of certain senior posts and 
generally  reduced the prospects for 
p ro m o tio n . The in v es tig a tio n  in to  
which functions could not be trans­
ferred was also carried out internally 
by the C P A ’s O rg an isa tio n  and 
W orkstudy D epartm ent (although it 
was subject to final approval by the 
Commission for Administration). It is 
then perhaps not surprising that insuffi­
cient staff were transferred.
CONCLUSION
This case study has show n that the 
implementation of LUPO has not led to 
a m ajor increase in the Cape Town 
City C ouncil’s control over its town 
planning policy. A lthough there has 
been a certain amount of decentralisa­
tion of planning powers to the CCC, 
they have not been m ajor in content 
nor devolved in nature. What land use 
pow ers have been  d e c e n tra lised  
to  loca l a u th o ritie s  have been  o f 
the d e leg a ted  v a rie ty . M ost o f the 
im p o rtan t pow ers are he ld  by the 
Provincial A dm inistrator, a govern­
ment appointee. Also, the Administra­
tor and the W hite M inisterial Repre­
sentative have the right to hear appeals 
against the CCC’s planning decisions. 
The cen tra lis t a ttitude  o f the la tte r 
body, in particular, has made a mock­
ery of the government’s much vaunted 
policy of devolution.
1 In  1986  th e  e le c te d  P ro v in c ia l C o u n c il  sy s te m  w a s  sc ra p p e d . U n d e r  th e  c u r re n t p ro v in c ia l  sy s te m , th e  A d m in is tra to rs  a re  v e s te d  w ith  
e x te n s iv e  p o w ers .
2  A c c o rd in g  lo  C P A  in te rv ie w e e s , M in is te r  H e u n is  h a d  in fac t p re s su re d  th e  a u th o rity  to  tra n s fe r  p o w e rs  as so o n  a s  p o s s ib le  to  the  
H o u se  o f  A sse m b ly . T h is  w as  lo  m o llify  r ig h t-w in g  su p p o r te rs  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t, w h o  saw  th e  “ o w n  a ffa irs ”  c o n c e p t as a  m ec h a n ism  
f o r  p ro te c tin g  W h ite s ’ rig h ts .
3  T h e  C P A  h a d  in  fa c t  a rg u e d  th a t  lo c a l  g o v e rn m e n t  m u s t  be c o n s id e re d  a  “ g e n e ra l  a f f a i r s "  a s p e c t  o f  c o m m u n ity  d e v e lo p m e n t .  
A c c o rd in g ly , n o  loca l g o v e rn m e n t p o w e rs  sh o u ld  be t ra n s fe rre d  to  th e  O w n  A ffa ir s  M in is tr ie s .
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